

# Practical Use of Finite Fields and their Performance on Modern CPUs

## GHASH in AES-GCM

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# Outline

1 AES-GCM

2 GHASH

3 Finite Field Multiplication on x86 CPUs

4 Performance

AES-GCM


# AES-GCM

## Introduction

- Authenticated Encryption (AE)
  - Very important building block in TLS
  - TLS 1.3: Only AE modes allowed
- AE modes in TLS 1.3
  - AES- $\{128,256\}$ -GCM
  - ChaCha20-Poly1305
  - AES-128-CCM

## AES-GCM

- AES in Galois Counter Mode
- Combination of:
  - AES in Counter Mode
  - GHASH authenticator



# GHASH

## Universal Hash Functions

- Concept by Carter and Wegman in 1977<sup>1</sup>
  - Family of hash functions  $H = \{h : U \mapsto [m]\}$  is called universal if

$$\forall x, y \in U, x \neq y : \Pr_{h \in H} [h(x) = h(y)] = \frac{1}{m}$$

- In other words, collision probability is as low as if hash values are truly randomly assigned for each key.
- Cryptographic properties such as preimage resistance not required!

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<sup>1</sup>Larry Carter and Mark N. Wegman, Universal Classes of Hash Functions, Proceedings of the 9th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1977

## Authenticators from Universal Hash Functions

Building a message authentication code (MAC) from universal hash functions:

1. Use universal hash function (selected by secret key) and hash message to short digest
2. Encrypt short digest by adding a one-time key

Provably secure in the information theoretic setting!

- one-time key not good for usability
  - replaced by function of nonce and secret key



GHASH

# GHASH

Polynomial based on input message blocks  $S_i$  (in AES-GCM this is the ciphertext), evaluated at secret key  $H = \text{AES}_k(0^{128})$

$$\text{GHASH}(H, A, C) = X_{m+n+1}$$


$$X_i = \sum_{j=1}^i S_j \cdot H^{i-j+1} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } i = 0 \\ (X_{i-1} + S_i) \cdot H & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Second form is iterative and used in most cases.

GHASH

## AES-GCM

- Look at structure of GHASH
  - Iterative form
  - final "one-time" key addition



# Finite Field Multiplication on x86 CPUs

## PCLMULQDQ

- Specialized CPU instruction
- **Carryless Multiplication**
  - $64\text{-bit} \times 64\text{-bit} \mapsto 128\text{-bit}$
- Carryless multiplication is equivalent to multiplication of polynomials over field  $\text{GF}(2)$ 
  - $\text{GF}(2^n)$  is usually represented as polynomials in  $\text{GF}(2)[X]$
  - Finite field multiplication is polynomial multiplication
    - followed by reduction with respect to some irreducible polynomial

## PCLMULQDQ (cont.)


- Representation of polynomial coefficients as bitstring:

$$a_{n-1}X^{n-1} + \dots + a_1X + a_0 \leftrightarrow a_{n-1} || \dots || a_1 || a_0$$

- Example:



$$X^7 + X^3 + X + 1 \leftrightarrow 10001011$$

- Store one  $\text{GF}(2^{128})$  element in a 128-bit CPU register




## PCLMULQDQ (cont.)

- PCLMULQDQ takes two 128-bit registers and a selection value imm



imm 10      res = xmm1[0:63] × xmm2[127:64]



# Multiplication of $GF(2^{128})$ elements

Combine the result of 4 sub-multiplications

xmm1 

127	64 63	0
11001100101 ... 1101010010	01111110001 ... 1010001001	

xmm2 

127	64 63	0
01001011101 ... 0101011111	01101100011 ... 0101111101	

01011100110 ... 0000110110	11000000001 ... 1101001111
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01011100110 ... 0000110110	11000000001 ... 1101001111
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01011100110 ... 0000110110	11000000001 ... 1101001111
----------------------------	----------------------------

01011100110 ... 0000110110	11000000001 ... 1101001111
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255	192 191	128 127	64 63	0
11000000001 ... 1101001111	11000000001 ... 1101001111	11000000001 ... 1101001111	11000000001 ... 1101001111	11000000001 ... 1101001111

## Modular Reduction

- Result needs to be reduced modulo the irreducible polynomial
  - No specialized instruction
- Option 1: Standard long division
  - **Slow** and tedious to implement
- Option 2: efficient reduction algorithm
  - Realizes division using only **2** multiplications
  - Special form of Barret reduction algorithm<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>P. Barrett, Implementing the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Public Key Encryption Algorithm on a Standard Digital Signal Processor, Master's Thesis, University of Oxford, UK, 1986



## Efficient Modular Reduction

- We have a 256-bit polynomial  $a(X)$  and want to reduce it modulo  $g(X)$ :

$$r(X) = a(X) \bmod g(X).$$

- use linearity to split calculation in two halves:

$$\begin{aligned} r(X) &= (c(X) \cdot X^{128} + b(X)) \bmod p(X) = c(X) \cdot X^{128} \bmod p(X) + b(X) \bmod p(X) \\ &= c(X) \cdot X^{128} \bmod p(X) + b(X). \end{aligned}$$

- Focus on efficient calculation of  $p(X) = c(X) \cdot X^{128} \bmod p(X)$ 
  - “Reduce upper half of 256-bit register and xor result with lower half”

## Efficient Modular Reduction (cont.)

$$p(X) = c(X) \cdot X^{128} \bmod g(X) = g(X) \cdot q(X) \bmod X^{128},$$

where  $q(X)$  is the result of the division of  $c(X) \cdot X^{128}$  by  $g(X)$ :

$$c(X) \cdot X^{128} = g(X) \cdot q(X) + p(X).$$

### Why does the first equality hold?

Since the 128 least significant terms of  $c(X) \cdot X^{128}$  are zero, the least significant 128 bits of  $g(X) \cdot q(X)$  and  $p(X)$  must be equal, so they cancel to zero in the addition. This reduces the modular reduction to finding the quotient  $q(X)$  and a finite field multiplication (the final reduction modulo  $X^{128}$  is equivalent to taking the lower 128 bit of the result).

## Efficient Modular Reduction (cont.)

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## Efficient Modular Reduction (cont.)

How to find  $q(X)$ ?

$$q(X) = MSB(c(X) \cdot q^+(X)),$$

where  $q^+(X)$  is the result of the division of  $X^{256}$  by  $g(X)$  (precompute once):

$$X^{256} = g(X) \cdot q^+(X) + p^+(X).$$

This is similar to the calculation of the quotient in the Barrett reduction algorithm. For more details on this step, refer to the Intel White Paper<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup><https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/72/cc/clmul-wp-rev-2.02-2014-04-20.pdf>

## Efficient Modular Reduction Algorithm

- Precompute  $q^+(X)$  for the given irreducible polynomial  $g(X)$

Modular reduction algorithm:

1. Multiply  $c(X)$ , the upper half of the input, with  $q^+(X)$
2. Take the upper 128-bit half of the result and multiply it with  $g(X)$
3. Add  $b(X)$ , the lower half of the input to the result of the calculation
4. Return the 128 least significant bits as the reduced result

Performance

# Performance

## Performance of AES-GCM

Features	Throughput [MB/s]
(CT) Software only	67.24
AES-NI	224.20
PCLMULQDQ	87.73
Both	1013.63

**Table:** Performance of AES-128-GCM on Intel Xeon E3-1220 @ 3.1GHz<sup>4</sup>

Without specialized instructions for PCLMULQDQ, the calculation of GHASH bottlenecks the AES computations with AES-NI.

<sup>4</sup>Based on Thomas Pornin's BearSSL benchmarks: <https://www.bearssl.org/speed.html>

Questions?

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