

# ZKB<sub>00</sub> / ZKB<sub>++</sub>

Kevin Pretterhofer

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## Multi-Party Computation (MPC)

- Consider function:  $f(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$ 
  - $\mathbf{x} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n\}$
- Consider  $n$  players:  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n$ 
  - $P_i$  holds secret value  $\mathbf{x}_i$
- Players jointly compute  $f(\mathbf{x})$ 
  - without revealing secret value  $\mathbf{x}_i$

## Zero-Knowledge Proofs

- Let  $L$  be a NP-language, with witness relation  $R$ , s.t.  
$$L = \{x \mid \exists w : R(x, w) = 1\}$$
- Let  $P$  be the prover and  $V$  be the verifier
- $P$  wants to convince  $V$  that  $x \in L$  and even more that  $P$  knows  $w$ 
  - Completeness
  - Soundness
  - Zero-Knowledge

## Sigma Protocols

- Interactive 3-move protocol
- Properties:
  - Complete
  - Special Soundness
  - Special honest-verifier ZK
- Can be made non-interactive:  
Fiat-Shamir heruistics [FS]




# ZKBoo [GMO]

## Introduction

- Zero-Knowledge proof system
  - Tailored for boolean circuits
- "MPC-in-the-head"-paradigm [Ish+]

## (2,3)-decomposition

- Considering  $y = \phi(x)$ 
  - Share
  - $\bigcup_{j=1}^N \{\phi_1^{(j)}, \phi_2^{(j)}, \phi_3^{(j)}\}$
  - $\text{Output}_1, \text{Output}_2, \text{Output}_3$
  - Rec
- Correctness
- (2)-Privacy



## The protocol $\Pi_{\phi}^*$ to evaluate $\phi$

1. Sample random tapes  $\mathbf{k}_1, \mathbf{k}_2, \mathbf{k}_3$
2.  $(\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{x}_3) \leftarrow \text{Share}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{k}_1, \mathbf{k}_2, \mathbf{k}_3)$
3. Let  $\mathbf{w}_1, \mathbf{w}_2, \mathbf{w}_3$  be vector with  $N + 1$  entries
4. Initialize  $\mathbf{w}_i[0]$  with  $\mathbf{x}_i$  for all  $i \in [3]$
5. For  $j = 1 \dots N$  compute:  
 For  $i = 1, 2, 3$  compute:  
 $\mathbf{w}_i[j] = \phi_i^{(j)}((\mathbf{w}_m[0..j-1], \mathbf{k}_m)_{m \in \{i, i+1\}})$
6. For  $j = 1 \dots N$  compute:  
 For  $i = 1, 2, 3$  compute:  
 $\mathbf{w}_i[j] = \phi_i^{(j)}((\mathbf{w}_m[0..j-1], \mathbf{k}_m)_{m \in \{i, i+1\}})$
7. Compute  $\mathbf{y}_i = \text{Output}_i(\mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{k}_i)$  for  $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$
8. Compute  $\mathbf{y} = \text{Rec}(\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{y}_3)$



## The Linear Decomposition

- Share( $\mathbf{x}; k_1, k_2, k_3$ ) samples random  $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{x}_3$  s.t.  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_1 + \mathbf{x}_2 + \mathbf{x}_3$
- $\bigcup_{j=1}^N \{\phi_1^{(j)}, \phi_2^{(j)}, \phi_3^{(j)}\}$ :
  - unary "add  $\alpha$ ":
 
$$\mathbf{w}_i[c] = \begin{cases} \mathbf{w}_i[a] + \alpha, & \text{if } i = 1 \\ \mathbf{w}_i[a] & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
  - unary "mult  $\alpha$ ":
 
$$\mathbf{w}_i[c] = \alpha \cdot \mathbf{w}_i[a]$$
- binary addition:
 
$$\mathbf{w}_i[c] = (\mathbf{w}_i[a] + \mathbf{w}_i[b])$$
- binary multiplication:
 
$$\mathbf{w}_i[c] = \mathbf{w}_i[a] \cdot \mathbf{w}_i[b] + \mathbf{w}_{i+1}[a] \cdot \mathbf{w}_i[b] + \mathbf{w}_i[a] \cdot \mathbf{w}_{i+1}[b] + R_i(c) - R_{i+1}(c)$$
- Output $_i(\mathbf{w}_i, \mathbf{k}_i)$  selects shares of the output wires
- Rec( $\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{y}_3$ ) outputs
 
$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{y}_2 + \mathbf{y}_3$$

## The ZKBoo Protocol

1. Prover runs  $\Pi_{\phi}^*$  and obtain  $\mathbf{w}_i$  and  $\mathbf{y}_i$  for all  $i$
2. Commit to  $\mathbf{c}_i = \text{Com}(\mathbf{k}_i, \mathbf{w}_i)$  for all  $i$
3. Send  $\mathbf{a} = (\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{y}_3, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \mathbf{c}_3)$
4. Verifier chooses  $\mathbf{e} \in [3]$  and sends to prover
5. Prover opens  $\mathbf{c}_e, \mathbf{c}_{e+1}$  revealing  $\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{k}_e, \mathbf{w}_e, \mathbf{k}_{e+1}, \mathbf{w}_{e+1})$
6. Verifier checks:  $\text{Rec}(\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{y}_3) \neq \mathbf{y}$ , reject
7. If  $\exists i \in \{e, e + 1\}$  s.t.  $\mathbf{y}_i \neq \text{Output}_i(\mathbf{w}_i)$ , reject
8. If  $\exists j$  s.t.  $\mathbf{w}_e[j] \neq \phi_e^{(j)}(\mathbf{w}_e, \mathbf{w}_{e+1}, \mathbf{k}_e, \mathbf{k}_{e+1})$ , reject
9. Accept

ZKB++ [Cha+]

## Optimizations

- Not including input shares
- Not including commitments
- No additional randomness for commitments
- Not including the output shares
- Not including  $\text{View}_e$

Thank you for your attention!

## Bibliography I

- [Cha+] Melissa Chase et al. **Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives**. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2017, Dallas, TX, USA, October 30 - November 03, 2017.
- [FS] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. **How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems**. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '86, Santa Barbara, California, USA, 1986, Proceedings.

## Bibliography II

- [GMO] Irene Giacomelli, Jesper Madsen, and Claudio Orlandi. **ZKBoo: Faster Zero-Knowledge for Boolean Circuits**. 25th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 16, Austin, TX, USA, August 10-12, 2016.
- [Ish+] Yuval Ishai et al. **Zero-knowledge from secure multiparty computation**. Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, San Diego, California, USA, June 11-13, 2007.