

Foundations of Lattice Cryptography

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Mathematical Foundations of Cryptography – WT 2019/20

Outline

Foundations of Lattice Cryptography

- Shortest Integer Solution (SIS)
- Learning with Errors (LWE)
- Regev's LWE Cryptosystem
- Ring-SIS
- Ring-LWE

Literature

The slides are based on the following sources

- **A Decade of Lattice Cryptography**, Chris Peikert

Foundations of Lattice Cryptography

Short Integer Solution (SIS)

Definition (SIS)

Given m uniformly random vectors $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, forming the columns of a matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, find a nonzero integer vector $z \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ of norm $\|z\| \leq \beta$ such that

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$$Az = 0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n.$$

- Without constraint on $\|z\|$, it is easy to find solution via Gaussian elimination.
- Corresponds to SVP in the following lattice

$$L(A) := \{z \in \mathbb{Z}^m : Az = 0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\} \supset q\mathbb{Z}^m.$$

Learning with Errors (LWE)

Definition (LWE Distribution)

For a vector $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ called the secret, the **LWE distribution** $A_{s,\chi}$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ is sampled by choosing $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ uniformly at random, choosing $e \leftarrow \chi$, and outputting

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Definition (Search-LWE $_{n,q,\chi,m}$)

Given m independent samples $(a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ drawn from $A_{s,\chi}$ for a uniformly random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ (fixed for all samples), **find** s .

Regev's LWE Cryptosystem

Gen: secret key is a random LWE secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$; public key is some $m \approx (n + 1) \log q$ samples $(a_i, b_i = s \cdot a_i + e_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ drawn from $A_{s, \chi}$. Set

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} A \\ b^t \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1) \times m}.$$

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Enc: $m \in \{0, 1\}$, choose $x \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^m$, then

$$c \leftarrow Mx + \left(0, m \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}.$$

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Dec:

$$\begin{aligned} (-s, 1)^t \cdot c &= (-s, 1)^t Mx + m \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor = e^t x + m \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \\ &\approx m \left\lfloor \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor \end{aligned}$$

LWE and Lattices

Definition (Bounded Distance Decoding Problem (BDD_γ))

Given a basis B of an n -dimensional lattice L and a target point $t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ with the guarantee that $\text{dist}(t, L) < d = \lambda_1(L)/2\gamma(n)$, find the unique lattice vector $v \in L$ such that $\|t - v\| < d$.

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Search-LWE can be seen as BDD problem in the lattice

$$L(A) := \{x \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \exists s \in \mathbb{Z}^n, x = As \pmod{q}\} = A\mathbb{Z}_q^n + q\mathbb{Z}^m,$$

with target point $t = b$ and $\text{dist}(b, L) = \|s\| \approx \sqrt{m} \cdot \sqrt{\text{Var}(A_{s,\chi})}$.

Hardness of LWE

Definition (Decisional Approximate SVP (GapSVP_γ))

Given a basis B of an n -dimensional lattice L where either $\lambda_1(L) \leq 1$ or $\lambda_1(L) > \gamma(n)$, determine which is the case.

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Reduction from search LWE to GapSVP on arbitrary n -dimension lattices.

Ring-SIS

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$$R_q := R/qR = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n - 1)$$

Definition (Ring-SIS)

Given m uniformly random elements $a_j \in R_q$, defining a vector $\mathbf{a} \in R_q^m$, find $0 \neq \mathbf{z} \in R_q^m$ of norm $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \beta$ s.t.

$$\mathbf{a}^T \cdot \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \in R_q.$$

R-SIS versus SIS

In R-SIS each random element $a \in R_q$ corresponds to n related vectors in $a_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ in SIS:

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Multiplication by $a \in R_q$ is a \mathbb{Z} -linear function from R to R_q

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This yields the correspondence between a R-SIS instance $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_m) \in R_q^m$ and the (structured) SIS instance

$$A = [A_{a_1} \mid \dots \mid A_{a_m}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times nm}.$$

Geometry of Rings and Ideal lattices

What is a short vector in R ?

- Coefficient embedding: $\sigma : \mathbb{Z}[X] \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$ depends on the choice of representatives of R .
- Canonical embedding: $\sigma : \mathbb{Z}[X] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ independent of representatives of R .

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An **ideal lattice** is a lattice corresponding to an ideal in R under some embedding. Ideals of R are closed under multiplication by X . Corresponds to rotation by one coordinate in the coefficient embedding, i.e.

$$(x_1, \dots, x_n) \in L \Rightarrow (x_{1+k}, \dots, x_{n+k}) \in L.$$

Hardness and Efficiency of R-SIS (compared to SIS)

Hardness:

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Efficiency:

- Key size of order n instead of n^2 .
- In addition, multiplication can be performed in quasi-linear time using FFT-like techniques.

Ring LWE

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Connection to LWE:

Given a R-LWE sample $(a, b = s \cdot a + e) \in R_q \times R_q$, we can transform it to n LWE samples

$$(A_a, b^t = s^t A_a + e^t) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n,$$

where A_a correspondence to multiplication by a .