

Weak-point bitstream

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November 17, 2023

Bitstream Lifecycle




Figure 1: FPGA Design flow [1]

What is a bitstream? [2], [3]

- Produced by Vendor-specific software
- Result of translation from HDL
- Usually proprietary
- Encrypted, Authenticated or Unencrypted
- Configures logic blocks/cores of FPGA

Bitstream Lifecycle

Phases of the bitstream cycle [1]:

1. **Bitstream-Generation:**

Generation of bitstream file via FPGA design tools

2. **Bitstream-at-Rest:**

Bitstream has been generated, stored on disk/cloud/...

3. **Bitstream-Loading:**

Loading of bitstream from non-volatile memory to FPGA configuration

4. **Bitstream-Running:**

Running FPGA, with bitstream configured

5. **Bitstream-EOL:**

End of life, after bitstream and/or FPGA is decommissioned

Bitstream Generation

IP-level threats [1], [4]

- **Trojan Attacks:**

Post-synthesis modifications, change placement – Power consumption, profile rarely activated logic [5]–[7]

- **IP Piracy:**

IP theft, overuse, reverse engineering – Watermarking, PUF-challenge to unlock core, logic obfuscation [8]–[10]

- **Vulnerabilities:**

Unintended vulnerabilities during conversion, malicious tooling – Randomize placement, check for equivalence [11]–[13]




Figure 2: Bitstream Generation Flow [1]

Attacks on stored bitstream files [1], [4]

- **Bitstream Tampering:**

Plaintext manipulations – Logic locking (PUF), obfuscation [14]–[16]

- **Bitstream Encryption:**

Prevents manipulation [14]

- **Red/Black Encryption:**

Black key on FPGA generates decryption via PUF [17]

- **IP Piracy:**

Reverse engineering – Watermarking [18]

Bitstream at Rest




Figure 3: Red/Black Encryption [17]

During configuration of silicon [1], [4]

- **Side Channel Threats:**

Collect information, extract keys – Key rolling, optical reflectance [17], [19], [20]

- **FPGA-based SoCs:**

Boot process loads bitstream – Authentication [17], [21]

- **Bitstream Replay Threats:**

Configuration downgrade – Versioning, critical switch [22], [23]




Figure 4: Bitstream Versioning [22]

Bistream Running

FPGA is operating [1], [4]

- **Fault Injection:**

Glitches – Detect bitflips via reconfiguration core [24]–[26]

- **Run-time Attacks:**

Leak or corrupt information on shared systems
– Vendor screening, sensors to detect glitches [27]–[29]




Figure 5: Attack over logical separation [27]

FPGA/Bitstream decommissioned [1]

- **Bitstream Remanence:**

Bitstream remains on board – Zeroise memory [22], [29]

- **Device Counterfeiting:**

Selling of used devices, bootleg – Device-specific markings [30]–[32]

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