

Formal verification in hardware design

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Introduction

Testing vs verification [1]

Traditional testing

- Test if system behaves according to expectations
- "Correct" behaviour often described ambiguously
- Tests may not detect some bugs
→ only probabilistic assurances

Formal verification

- Prove a system behaves according to its specification using mathematically sound techniques
- "Correct" behaviour entirely based on unambiguous specification
- Works on abstractions of the physical device

Verification pitfalls [1]

- Specification may not capture client's intention
- Time/Space effort may be huge for bigger designs
- May not capture manufacturing faults/time/environment of physical device
→ assumptions need to be made

Verification Approaches [1], [2]

- Specifying desired properties
- High level model as specification
- Combinations of both

Specifying Desired Properties

Model-Checking Introduction [1], [3]

1. stipulate specification as properties that must hold
2. abstract system into a model
 - different modelling techniques available
 - modelling possible at different stages (VHDL/Netlist)
3. verify algorithmically that model fits specification
or produce counter example if model doesn't fit specification

Model-Checking Approaches [1], [3]

- Different Model-Checking approaches
 - CTL*/CTL/LTL Model-Checking
 - symbolic state representation
 - explicit state representation
 - μ -calculus
 - Trajectory Formulas
 - ...
- Different approaches also differ in **expressiveness** and **runtime**
→ rule of thumb: Consider the properties you need and choose approach accordingly

Temporal logic and explicit Model-Checking - Overview [1], [3]

- Hardware model is explicit (e.g. State Transition Graph/Kripke Structure)
- Specification provided in temporal logic
 - Rough idea: allows specifying what propositions need to hold with respect to time
 - Based on propositional logic extended with temporal operators and path quantifiers
 - Many different temporal logics exist: CTL*/**CTL**/LTL)
 - Verification effort depends on which temporal logic is used
 - Expressiveness depends on which temporal logic is used

Modelling hardware using state transition graphs

```
1 module hardware_design (clk , s , bad );
2   input clk;
3   output reg [1:0] s;
4   output reg bad;
5   initial s = 2'b00;
6   initial bad = 0;
7   always @(posedge clk) begin
8     case (s)
9       2'b00: s <= 2'b10;
10      2'b01: s <= 2'b01;
11      2'b10: s <= 2'b01;
12      2'b11: begin
13        s <= 2'b10; bad <= 1;
14      end
15    endcase
16  end
17 endmodule
```




Figure 1: Hardware as state transition graph M_1

State transition graph - Example [1]




Figure 2: Traffic light state transition graph [1]

- System consisting of two traffic lights
- Atomic Propositions $([ns], [ew])$
 - north-south
 - east-west
 - red, yellow, green colors

Computation path/tree example [1], [3]



Figure 3: Possible Computation Path




Figure 4: Full Computation Tree

CTL*/CTL/LTL [1], [3]

- Discrete model of time
- Set of shared temporal operators
- Set of path quantifiers
- CTL*/CTL/LTL differ in what temporal operator and path quantifier combinations are allowed

Temporal Operators:

- X : Next
- U : Until
- G : Globally
- F : Eventually

Path Quantifiers:

- A : for all paths
- E : there exists a path

We will focus on CTL for in this presentation

Temporal operators visualized




Figure 5: Temporal operators visualized

CTL Definition [1]

- $\forall p \in AP$ is a CTL formula
- If f_1 and f_2 are CTL formulas, then $\neg f_1$, $f_1 \wedge f_2$, AXf_1 , EXf_1 , $A(f_1 U f_2)$ and $E(f_1 U f_2)$ are also CTL formulas
 - AXf holds for s_0 if along all paths f holds in all direct successor states
 - EXf holds for s_0 if there exists a path on which f holds for the direct successor state
 - $A(f_1 U f_2)$ holds for s_0 if along all paths f_1 always holds until f_2 holds
 - $E(f_1 U f_2)$ holds for s_0 if there exists a path on which f_1 always holds until f_2 holds
 - even more "composite" operators available:
 - $EFf = E(true U f)$ holds if there exists a path on which f eventually holds
 - $AGf = \neg EF\neg f$ holds if along all paths f holds for every state
 - ...

CTL verification using explicit Model-Checking [1]

- Based on labeling states of State Transition Graph
- Every operator pair (eg. EXp , AFp) comes with a graph-search based algorithm
Example: For the pair EXp : a state is labeled EXp if some of its successors have the label p in $O(|S| + |R|)$
- For a given CTL formula f and an initial state s_0 :
 1. Break up f into all of its subformulas (inside-out)
 2. Apply labels to the Graph using these subformulas
 3. If s_0 is labeled with f then $M, s_0 \models f$
- Complexity: $O(|f|(|S| + |R|))$

CTL Model-Checking - Example

- $f = AF(EXq)$, where $q = ([ew] = g)$
- $s_0 = (r, r)$




Figure 6: Traffic light state transition graph M [1]

CTL Model-Checking - Example

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


Figure 7: Traffic light state transition graph M [1]

CTL Model-Checking - Example

- $f = AF(\mathbf{EX}q)$, where $q = ([ew] = g)$
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


Figure 8: Traffic light state transition graph M [1]

CTL Model-Checking - Example

- $f = \mathbf{AF}(\mathbf{EX}q)$, where $q = ([ew] = g)$
- $s_0 = (r, r)$
- $M, s_0 \models f$




Figure 9: Traffic light state transition graph M [1]

Specifying high level models [1]

Specifying high level models

- High level model serves as system specification
- Implementation is the refinement of high level model (i.e implementation details are abstracted away from high level model)
- Sometimes multiple abstraction layers between high level model and implementation
- Different abstraction approaches (out of scope for this paper)
- Refinement-Checking: Use mathematically sound reasoning to verify that your hardware is an implementation of the model

Combining property-based and high level model based approaches

Combining different techniques to formally verify a SoC [2]

- IP cores can be verified, or come with specification and are pre-verified by vendors
- Standard SoC bus can also be verified using SMV Model-Checker
- IP cores may expect different bus protocol
 - "glue" logic required to connect standard bus to IP core
 - collection of abstractions between standard bus other protocols can be model-checked
 - verify that implementation of glue logic is a refinement of previously defined abstraction
- using the IP core specs, glue-abstraction specification, bus-specification, verify that the whole SoC complies to its specification

Conclusions

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- Verification is based on mathematical sound properties and requires a formal specification
- Verification is executed on models → can't guarantee Hardware was manufactured correctly
- Two main approaches: High Level Model Specification vs Property Based Approach
- Different techniques require different assumptions and have different expressiveness and runtime requirements

References

- [1] C. Kern and M. R. Greenstreet, **Formal verification in hardware design: A survey**, ACM Trans. Des. Autom. Electron. Syst., vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 123–193, Apr. 1999, ISSN: 1084-4309. DOI: 10.1145/307988.307989. [Online]. Available: <https://doi.org/10.1145/307988.307989>.
- [2] P. Chauhan, E. Clarke, Y. Lu, and D. Wang, **Verifying ip-core based system-on-chip designs**, in Twelfth Annual IEEE International ASIC/SOC Conference (Cat. No.99TH8454), 1999, pp. 27–31. DOI: 10.1109/ASIC.1999.806467.
- [3] E. M. Clarke Jr, O. Grumberg, D. Kroening, D. Peled, and H. Veith, Model Checking (Cyber Physical Systems Series), 2nd ed. London, England: MIT Press, Dec. 2018.