## Hardware-assisted Virtualization on non-Intel Processors

Alexander Deibel, Florian Kargl, Stefan Weiglhofer, Hannes Weissteiner May 10, 2021

#### Content

Overview of virtualization techniques on various architectures

- AMD
- ARM
- RISC-V

## **AMD**


## AMD Virtualization (AMD-V)

- Released in 2006 for Athlon 64 series
- Basic functionality supported by all Zen-based AMD processors
- Some extensions (e.g. AMD-SEV) only for higher-end/server models
- Similar concepts to Intel VT-x



#### AMD-V Architecture

- Adds new privilege mode exclusively for hypervisor use
- VMM in "ring -1"
- Two operation modes:
  - Host mode (similar to VMX Root Operation)
  - Guest mode (similar to VMX Non-Root Operation)



#### **AMD-V** Instructions

Setting EFER.SVME to 1 enables the following instructions (similar to VMXON instruction on Intel):


- VMRUN to enter guest mode
- VMLOAD/VMSAVE saves/restores additional guest state information
- CLGI/STGI sets/clears the global interrupt flag (GIF)
- INVLPGA allows to selectively invalidate TLB mappings using a given ID (ASID)
- VMMCALL a way for a guest to explicitly call the VMM
- SKINIT used to verify and load trusted software (e.g. a VMM)

## Virtual Machine Control Block (VMCB)

- Data structure (similar to VMCS on Intel)
- Contains:
  - Control bits to define the guest exit behaviour
  - Control bits that specify the execution environment (e.g. nested paging)
  - A guest processor state (e.g. control registers, ...)
- VMRUN/VMEXIT only saves/restores minimal amount of state information
- VMLOAD/VMSAVE used to load/store additional state information (e.g. hidden processor states, ...)

## **Entering VMM mode**

- Enter guest mode with VMRUN instruction (comparable to VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME)
- Guest runs until a #VMEXIT occurs



## Exiting VMM mode (#VMEXIT)

- Guest runs until intercepts happens:
  - Exception or Interrupt
  - Instruction (e.g. VMMCALL)
- Information about the exit reason is put into the VMCB
- Advanced Virtual Interrupt Controller (AVIC)
  - Reduction of interrupt overhead for virtualization

#### AMD-V Further Features

#### Second Level Address Translation

Nested Page tables (NPT)/Rapid Virtualization Indexing (RVI) (EPT on Intel):

- Enable by setting NP\_ENABLE bit in the VMCB to 1
- Set NPT base pointer via N\_CR3 in the VMCB

#### TLB Control


TLB entries are tagged with Address Space Identifier (ASID) to differentiate between guest physical address spaces

#### • I/O-Virtualization

AMD-Vi: enables virtualization of I/O-devices through the use of DMA and interrupt remapping

## **AMD-V Security Extensions**

- Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
   Guards against guest memory inspection by assigning a unique AES encryption key to automatically encrypt their in-use data
- SEV Encrypted State (SEV-ES)
   Guest register state is encrypted on each hypervisor transition
- SEV Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
   Adds memory integrity protection



## **ARM**

## Not too long ago in a galaxy not all that far away...

# **ARMv7-A** without extensions $(\sim 2005-2011)$

- Lots of different processor modes
  - Different registers available
  - Different stack space
  - Determines privilege level
- Some operations only available in privileged modes
- No virtualization support




Figure 1: ARMv7-A processor modes

#### Popek and Goldberg virtualization requirements

- Equivalence
  - Guest software behaves identical to native execution
- Resource control
  - Guest software is not allowed to access physical state and resources
- Efficiency
  - All non-sensitive instructions are executed natively without VMM intervention

- Sensitive instructions
   Instructions that change/read system state, access physical resources, ...
- Privileged instructions
   Privileged instructions are always
   trapped into a privileged mode when executed in an unprivileged mode.

#### Popek and Goldberg theorem

If the set of sensitive instructions is a subset of privileged instructions, a system can be efficiently virtualized.

 $\Rightarrow \mathsf{Trap}\text{-}\mathsf{and}\text{-}\mathsf{emulate}\ \mathsf{virtualization}$ 

#### Problems with ARMv7-A:

- Not all sensitive instructions are privileged and cause a trap, e.g.
  - Interaction with coprocessors (modify system state)
  - Wait for interrupt
  - Return from event handlers (change processor mode)
- ⇒ ARMv7-A can *not* be virtualized via trap-and-emulate!

But: Not all is lost, virtualization still possible via dynamic binary translation

- VMM interprets guest code at runtime and emulates sensitive instructions
- Unfortunately quite slow...

Full system virtualization not used very often for ARMv7-A

⇒ Paravirtualization to the rescue

## Solving the ARM virtualization problem

**Virtualization Extensions** introduced for the ARMv7-A architecture in 2011 to solve these problems.

- New *Hyp* mode with higher privilege level 2
- Allow sensitive instructions to be trapped into the hypervisor mode
- Two stage address translation for VMs (similar to Intel EPT)
- IRQs and exceptions can be routed to the hypervisor + virtual IRQ injection
- HVC hypervisor call instruction (for paravirtualization)
- Virtualization support for standard peripherals (interrupt controller, timer)
- No dedicated VM control block in memory. State needs to be saved/restored by the hypervisor.

#### **ARMv7-A Virtualization Extensions**




Figure 2: ARMv7-A modes

Mode	Description	
Supervisor (SVC)	Entered on reset and when a Supervisor call instruction (SVC) is executed	Privileged modes
FIQ	Entered when a high priority (fast) interrupt is raised	
IRQ	Entered when a normal priority interrupt is raised	
Abort	Used to handle memory access violations	
Undef	Used to handle undefined instructions	
Нур	Used for hardware virtualization support	
Monitor	Used for TrustZone secure monitor program	
System	Privileged mode using the same registers as User mode	
User	Mode under which most Applications / OS tasks run	Unprivilege mode

**Figure 3:** ARMv7-A modes with virtualization extension

## ARMv7-A Virtualization Extensions - Privilege Levels

'Un-/privileged' renamed to privilege level (PL)

- **PL0**: User applications
- PL1: (Guest) kernel
- PL2: Hypervisor




Figure 4: ARMv7-A virtualization extension privilege levels

#### Armv8-A overview

- Exception Levels
- Execution states
- Memory Management






Figure 5: Arm

#### Armv8-A overview




## **Armv8-A Virtual Memory**



## **ARMv8-A - Virtual Memory**

#### EL0/EL1 virtual address space is split in two parts


- Low virtual addresses (userspace)
  - Size configurable via TCR\_EL1.TOSZ
  - Page table base TTBR0\_EL1
- High virtual addresses (kernel)
  - Size configurable via TCR\_EL1.T1SZ
  - Page table base TTBR1\_EL1



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
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## **ARMv8-A Virtualization Extensions - Virtual Memory**

## EL0/1 (Guest OS)


- Two stage address translation
  - Guest virtual address
    - ightarrow Intermediate physical address
    - ightarrow Host physical address
      - Set stage 2 page table base via VTTBR\_EL2
  - Enable via HCR\_EL2.VM
  - TLB entries tagged with VMID from VTTBR\_EL2



#### ARMv8-A Virtualization Extensions - Virtual Memory

#### **EL2** (Hypervisor)


- Separate page tables for EL2
  - Base address in TTBR0\_EL2
- Only low virtual addresses available (no TTBR1\_EL2)



## **ARMv8-A Virtualization Extensions - Trapping operations**

Instructions to be trapped configurable in HCR\_EL2


- Trap triggers exception into EL2
- 2. Inspect ESR\_EL2 for exception reason
- 3. Modify guest state
- 4. Return to guest via ERET



## **ARMv8-A Virtualization Extensions - Exception routing**

Exceptions/IRQs/FIQs can be intercepted by hypervisor

- Enabled via HCR\_EL2.IMO
  - All IRQs routed to EL2 instead of EL0/EL1
  - Hypervisor can send virtual interrupts to guest by setting HCR\_EL2.VI




## Setting up virtualization

- Allocate space for guest state
- Setup Hypervisor Configuration register HCR\_EL2
  - Trapped instructions
  - Exception routing
- Set up stage 2 translation tables in VTTBR\_EL2
  - Page table base
  - VMID
- Setup EL1/EL0 registers for guest
- Execute ERET to return to guest VM
- Wait for hypervisor trap

#### **Problems with ARM Virtualization Extension**

The ARM virtualization extensions are great for type 1 (bare metal) hypervisors, but not so much for type 2 (hosted) hypervisors.


- Cannot run a kernel designed for EL1 in EL2. EL2 is not a superset of EL0/EL1 features.
  - Different system registers in EL1/EL2
  - Different virtual address space
    - Only low virtual addresses usable in EL2 (conflicts with userspace)
- Host kernel in EL1 + small hypervisor shim in EL2



#### ARMv8.1 - Virtualization Host Extensions

ARM Virtualization Host Extensions allow unmodified EL1 kernels to run in EL2 (good for type 2 hosted hypervisors)

- Lower+upper virtual address regions in EL2, similar to EL1
  - Enable via HCR\_EL2.E2H
  - Set HCR\_EL2.TGE when running host applications to route all exceptions to EL2
- Automatically redirect system register access to EL2 registers
  - EL1 registers still available as <reg>\_EL12





#### **ARMv8.4** - Nested Virtualization

- Guest Hypervisors can't run in EL2
- ARMv8.3: Trap accesses to \_EL2 registers
- Process the requested access in EL2

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
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#### ARMv8.4 - Nested Virtualization

- Guest Hypervisors can't run in EL2
- ARMv8.3: Trap accesses to \_EL2 registers
- Process the requested access in EL2

#### But that's slow

- Solution:
  - Capture the state of Guest-\_EL2 registers
  - State location in VNCR\_EL2
  - Handle on ERET
- Controlled by HCR\_EL2.NV\*-bits





## Hypervisor Extension, V0.6.1

- Draft Version 0.6.1, not yet accepted as standard
- Hosting of guest OS atop type-1 (bare-meta) or type-2 (hosted) hypervisor
- Focused on CPU Virtualization
  - Full duplicate of the CPU state (new and shadow CSRs)
  - ullet Two-Stage Address Translation (enabled when V=1)
  - No dedicated I/O virtualization specified



## **Privilege Modes**

- S-mode changed to HS-mode
- ullet In VU- and VS-mode V=1
- HS has higher interrupt priority than VS




Figure 6: RISC-V Privilege Levels

## **New Registers**

- Changed Machine Level Regs (added MPV GVA fields to mstatush)
- Hypervisor status hstatus
- hedeleg & hideleg delegate traps to VS-Mode guest
- Interrupt & Timing registers
- Trap registers htval, htinst
- Guest stage translation hgatp
- Accesses to following registers substitute to respective shadow registers (e.g. access to sstatus is directed to vsstatus)
  - sstatus, sip, sie, stvec, sscratch, sepc, scause, stval, satp

#### **New Instructions**


- Virtual-Machine Load and Store
  - only in M-mode or HS-mode
  - access guest virtual address space
  - inspect guest memory without mapping it
- Privileged Fence
  - Applies to the new memory spaces
  - Structures controlled by vsatp or hgatp

## **Two-Stage Address Translation**

- Virtual address converted to guest physical address (VS-stage)
- Guest physical address to supervisor physical address (G-stage)
- Root page table expanded by factor four to 16KiB
- Same format as single-stage address translation

#### **Reference Implementation**

- Rocket chip core
- Portet 'Bao' Hypervisor from ARM to RISC-V
- Optimized PLIC and CLINT
- Still no IOMMU, would improve DMA accesses (no traps to HS-mode)



**Figure 7:** RISC-V Hypervisor and Guest OS Privileges

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